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Entropy serves as a central observable which indicates uncertainty in many chemical, thermody-
namical, biological and ecological systems, and the principle of the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) is
widely supported in natural science. Recently, entropy is employed to describe the social system in
which human subjects are interacted with each other, but the principle of the maximum entropy
has never been reported from this field empirically. By using laboratory experimental data, we test
the uncertainty of strategy type in various competing environments with two person constant sum
2 × 2 game. Empirical evidence shows that, in this competing game environment, the outcome of
human’s decision-making obeys the principle of maximum entropy.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Cc 89.65.-s 01.50.My 02.50.Le
1 INTRODUCTION
Entropy is a concept from physics. Shannon [1](1948)
introduced entropy to information theory which is used
to measure the uncertainty of a system. It serves as a
central observable in many chemical, thermodynamical,
biological and ecological systems. The maximum entropy
principle [2] introduced by E.T.Jaynes(1957) indicated
that random crossing is an irreversible process, in which
the entropy increases to its’ maximum value. This prin-
ciple is widely supported in natural science. Recently,
Bednary et.al. [3] and Cason et.al. [4] apply the standard
entropy concept to laboratory social interaction system
as the signal of cognitive complexity. But the principle
of maximum entropy has never been reported from social
science empirically.
In game theory, the social system can be abstracted
as the process of individual decision-making and the out-
come or social state. While a specific game is given,
the potential social states are determined. This impli-
cates that one can measure the entropy of the social sys-
tem and test the principle of the maximum entropy in
this system. On the other hand, experimental economics
brought theoretical game to laboratory to test the pre-
diction of game theory. Therefore, it allows us to test the
principle of maximum entropy in social system by using
economics experimental data.
Constant Sum Game is one of the classical games
implying conflict behavior in a competing environment
which has Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium(MSNE).
That means there should exist some uncertainty in
decision-making in the game, and in consistent with this
uncertainty, there should be some probability distribu-
∗E-mail: jbzhang08@zju.edu.cn
tion of social states in repeated games. Obviously, the
probability distribution should not be the same under
different constraint conditions, i.e., different payoff ma-
trices. Our question is, giving the constraint condition,
does this competing game system obey the principle of
maximum entropy? If it does, how to test it?
In this paper, using a series of economics experimental
data of constant sum games, we firstly test the princi-
ple of the maximum entropy in human interaction social
system. The paper is organized as follow: section two
describes the entropy of an experimental game system in
formal; section three provides the prediction of the prin-
ciple of maximum entropy in constant sum game system
under different payoff matrices; section four introduces
the principle of experimental data selection; section five
demonstrates the result; finally, conclusion and discus-
sion.
2 ENTROPY IN LABORATORY SOCIAL
SYSTEM
For testing the entropy of the social system, we be-
gin this task with its’ simplest and most feasible type.
Constant Sum 2 × 2 Game is one of the simplest games
which indicates social interaction in competing environ-
ment, and allows us to conduct this game appropriate in
experimental laboratory by using human subjects. 2 × 2
Game that is usually described in its’ formal form as in
Fig. 1.
The player 1 and player 2 are the two persons of the
game who each have two strategies. The strategies for
player 1 are U and D, where U means player 1 chooses
up and D down, and for player 2 are L and R, where
L means left and R means right. The numeral a is the
payoff for player 1 when she/he chooses U and the player
2 chooses L, and the b is for player 2 in the same pair,
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FIG. 1: Payoff Matrix. Player 1’s payoff in the upper-left
corner, player 2’s payoff in the down-right corner.
and the rest is in the same manner. Constant Sum means
the payoff sum in each cell is equal. This implicates that
one would get less if the other gets more.
Individual stage game strategies have been modeled [3]
as a discrete random variable X. In the case of this
paper, the variable X may take on the values x ∈
X(i,j) . Here X(i,j) is the finite set of all possible
values for X, i = u, d, j = l, r, in other words, x ∈
X(i,j)= {(u,l),(u,r),(d,l),(d,r)} indicate all possible indi-
vidual stage game strategies. The probability that X
takes on the particular value x is written as Pr(X =
x), or just p(x). The probability p(x) is referred to
the joint probability that player 1 chooses i meanwhile
player 2 chooses j which is named the social state of
strategies(i, j) in these repeated games. The entropy of
a random variable X with a probability density function,
p(x) = Pr(X = x), is defined by
S(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log2 p(x), (1)
which is used to measure the amount of stochastic varia-
tion in a random variable that can assume a finite set of
values. Therefore, we come up with some mathematical
entity that takes a probability distribution and returns a
number that can be interpreted as a measure of the un-
certainty associated with that distribution. When using
logarithms of base r = 2, that measure is expressed in
binary variables (bits).
Throughout the analysis, we use the convention that
0log0 = 0. The entropy in a generic 2× 2 game is in the
interval [0, 2], with the lower bound indicating certainty,
i.e., all outcomes are more likely in one social state, and
the upper bound indicating a uniform distribution among
the four social states. A uniform distribution corresponds
to complete uncertainty, because in that case, every state
is equally likely to occur.
3 PREDICTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
MAXIMUM ENTROPY
The uncertainty may not be equal under different pay-
off matrices. The maximum entropy itself would be dif-
ferent among games. In other words, distribution p(u)
and p(l) determines the maximum entropy.
Given a certain distribution p(u) and p(l), the principle
of maximum entropy indicates that the random variable
X should reach the maximum uncertainty. That is to
say, the entropy is maximized by independent random
variables.
There are four variables to describe the joint distri-
bution, p(u, l), p(u, r), p(d, l) and p(d, r) in these games.
Supposing the mean observations p(u) and p(l) have been
obtained, there are three constraints for the four vari-
ables, p(u, l) + p(u, r) = p(u), p(u, l) + p(d, l) = p(l) and
p(u, l) + p(u, r) + p(d, l) + p(d, r) = 1.
We expressed all of the unknown probabilities in terms
of the fourth p(d, r). Therefore, these expressions were
substituted into the formula for entropy S(X), so that it
was expressed in terms of a single probability. Thus, the
entropy in Eq. (1) depends on only one variable, p(d, r).
Let dS/dp(d, r)=0, we get the solution of p(d, r)
p(d, r) = [1− p(u)][1− p(l)]. (2)
In the same manner, we get the other three solutions for
maximum entropy value as follow
p(u, l) = p(u)p(l)
p(u, r) = p(u)[1− p(l)] (3)
p(d, l) = [1− p(u)]p(l).
In short, given a probability distribution of two players’
strategies, the prediction of maximum entropy principle
is that the joint probability distribution should conform
closely to the Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). In another word,
the probability distribution of variable X indicating the
individual stage strategies must be the function of p(u)
and p(l) as it is shown in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3).
Take Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) into Eq. (1), one can get the
maximum entropy in the context of given p(u) and p(l).
It allows us to test the principle of maximum entropy by
using economics experimental data.
4 DATA SET AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN
Conventional experimental methods are well suited to
testing whether theories are false. But there are two re-
maining questions. First, is the sample sufficient? i.e.,
could one or two game experiments confirm or reject a
theory? Second, is the game carefully selected taking
into the experimenter’s effect? To avoid these queries,
Erev et.al. [5] designed and conducted 40 two-player two-
action constant sum games by using random sample to
compare different learning models. Among these experi-
mental games, there were 10 games that each had 9 inde-
pendent repetitive sessions and the others only had one
session. Therefore, we selected these 10 games as sam-
ples and reorganized them as in Tab. I according to the
Table I in their paper [5].
3TABLE I: Payoff Matrix of 10 game samples
game† UL‡ UR DL DR
1 77 35 8 48
2 73 74 87 20
3 63 8 1 17
4 55 75 73 60
5 5 64 93 40
6 46 54 61 23
7 89 53 82 92
8 88 38 40 55
9 40 76 91 23
10 69 5 13 33
† The game 31 to 40 in [5] is relabeled as 1 to 10 in this
paper.
‡ UL, UR, DL and DR, is labeled as AA, AB, BA and BB
respectively.
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FIG. 2: Payoff Matrix of matching pennies game.
Each player was asked to select between A and B. In
accordance with this paper, we call A and B as U and D
for player 1, L and R for player 2 respectively. The payoff
entry (i, j) presents the probability (×100) that player 1
wins when she chose i and her opponent chose j . The
payoff for each win was 4 cents which means constant
sum game. All 10 games were played by fixed pairs for
500 trials. The right hand columns show the proportion
of U choices and L choices in 500 trial by player 1 and
player 2 respectively.
For example, if in a given period both players choose
action ”A” then player 1 will win v with the specified
probability p1 listed in column UL, and player 2 will
win v with probability (1 − p1). A player who does
not win v earns zero in that period. A player’s payoff
from the game was the sum of his payoffs over the 500
rounds of play (plus a fixed showup fee). Each player
played only one game, against a fixed opponent. All
transactions were conducted anonymously via networked
computers in U.S.. In each random sample described
below, the probabilities p1 through p4 were indepen-
dently chosen from the uniform distribution on the val-
ues [0.00, 0.01, ...0.99, 1.00]. Games generated in this way
were included in the sample if they had a unique mixed
strategy equilibrium.
For testing the principle of maximum entropy in an ex-
treme situation , we plus an extra matching pennies game
with payoff matrix in Fig. 2 using the form as in Fig. 1, for
which the theoretical predication entropy should reach
the maximum value 2.
We conducted the experiment called game 11 similar
to the 10 games in Dec. 14, 2010 in Zhejiang University
in China with 12 independent pairs for 300 trials. Total
24 subjects participated in this game through recruit.
The payoff is 0.35 yuan RMB per 5 points, added fixed
showing up fee 5 yuan RMB. The p(u) and p(l) comes
out to be 0.512 and 0.514, respectively, closing to the the
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (0.5, 0.5).
5 RESULT
Results on game level
There are 9000 decision-making (2× 500× 9) in each
of the constant sum game from game 1 to game 10 each
of which consists of 9 pairs of subjects, each pair play 500
rounds and 7200 decision-making (2× 300× 12) in game
11 which consists of 12 pairs of subjects, each pair play
300 rounds. These turn out 4500 observations of strategy
pair as variable X in each of game 1 to game 10 and 3600
observations of strategy pair in game 11.
Looking at the two types of players separately, those in
the role of player 1 who chose U and those in the role of
player 2 who chose L in each game are described by p(u)
and p(l) in the second and third column of Tab. II. The
predictive maximum entropy for each of the 11 games
is calculated according to the Eq. (3) and Eq. (1) un-
der the probability distribution p(u) and p(l) in each
game. The results named as maximum entropy(MaxEnt)
are shown in the fourth column in Tab. II. Similarly, we
compute the experimental entropy named observation of
entropy(ObEnt) according to the joint probability from
raw data by Eq. (1). In the text, we call the ObEnt as
the empirical entropy and lay out the results explicit in
the last column in Tab. II.
TABLE II: Entropy in 11 constant sum games
game p(u) p(l) MaxEnt† ObEnt‡ obs§
1 0.591 0.318 1.877 1.862 4500
2 0.840 0.360 1.576 1.577 4500
3 0.583 0.222 1.730 1.738 4500
4 0.274 0.502 1.847 1.847 4500
5 0.378 0.320 1.861 1.862 4500
6 0.638 0.410 1.921 1.920 4500
7 0.295 0.522 1.870 1.849 4500
8 0.400 0.226 1.741 1.740 4500
9 0.562 0.449 1.981 1.981 4500
10 0.320 0.202 1.624 1.609 4500
11 0.512 0.514 1.999 1.999 3600
† The abbreviation of theatrical predicted maxi-
mum entropy under the given probability distri-
bution.
‡ The abbreviation of observed entropy in experi-
ments.
§ The total observed frequencies of any probability
in each round of experiments.
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FIG. 3: Obtained Entropy in the eleven 2 × 2 game with
mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. Experimental data comes
from Ref. [5] and our experiment. Horizon axis is the theoret-
ical expected value of the maximum entropy hypothesis and
the vertical axis is the empirical value.
The values of observed entropy are very close to the
predictions of the maximum entropy. The mean dif-
ference (observed entropy minus maximum entropy) is
−0.004, standard deviation is 0.009, minimum differ-
ence is −0.021 and the max is 0.008. Ratio estima-
tion of ObEnt/MaxEnt is linearized ratio equal to 0.998,
the standard error is 0.001, 95% confidence interval is
[0.995, 1.001].
Fig. 3 plots the results of comparing theoretical value
of maximum entropy and empirical value of entropy in
the 11 experiments. The theoretical value is expressed in
horizon axis and the empirical value is in vertical axis.
Each square with a numerical game label denotes the
mean use of U strategy and L strategy in that game. A
diagonal line which implies the empirical value equivalent
to theoretical value added for revealing how empirical en-
tropy approximate to the maximum entropy. The result
of linear regression is in Tab. III.
TABLE III: result of linear regression
obent Coef. Std.Err. t P > |t| [95%Conf.Interval]
maxent 1.000 0.022 46.36 0 0.952 1.049
cons -0.005 0.039 -0.13 0.901 -0.094 0.084
The results on game level show, the constant sum game
fits the Principle of Maximum Entropy very well.
Results on group level
Now, we will report the results at group level.
There are 9 independent groups with two fixed players
in each game from game 1 to game 10, and 12 indepen-
dent groups with two fixed players in game 11. Each
group can be looked as an independent social interaction
system. We can test the principle on group level in each
game too. We calculate the theoretical maximum entropy
TABLE IV: Entropy on group level
game1 game2 game3
group MaxEnt ObEnt MaxEnt ObEnt MaxEnt ObEnt
1 1.407 1.407 1.773 1.752 1.817 1.808
2 1.947 1.942 0.436 0.436 1.311 1.311
3 1.965 1.956 1.974 1.974 0.985 0.985
4 1.830 1.829 1.474 1.469 1.653 1.652
5 1.965 1.519 1.137 1.136 1.452 1.416
6 1.763 1.763 1.860 1.820 1.671 1.670
7 1.000 0.781 1.036 1.036 1.677 1.512
8 1.713 1.711 1.500 1.495 1.363 1.362
9 1.320 1.314 1.441 1.441 1.403 1.388
game4 game5 game6
group MaxEnt ObEnt MaxEnt ObEnt MaxEnt ObEnt
1 1.273 1.273 1.984 1.963 1.776 1.775
2 1.886 1.842 1.707 1.695 1.992 1.992
3 1.765 1.727 1.393 1.343 1.951 1.938
4 0.938 0.931 1.922 1.910 1.941 1.928
5 1.992 1.970 1.888 1.888 1.872 1.868
6 1.474 1.473 1.760 1.754 1.514 1.438
7 1.860 1.835 1.932 1.928 1.960 1.959
8 1.781 1.738 1.704 1.702 1.799 1.782
9 1.993 1.937 1.640 1.638 1.864 1.864
game7 game8 game9
group MaxEnt ObEnt MaxEnt ObEnt MaxEnt ObEnt
1 1.000 1.000 1.027 1.026 1.955 1.950
2 1.857 1.843 1.579 1.539 1.961 1.959
3 1.701 1.696 1.661 1.658 1.935 1.890
4 1.876 1.875 1.832 1.790 1.970 1.915
5 1.862 1.758 1.853 1.806 1.652 1.651
6 1.346 1.168 1.677 1.673 1.997 1.985
7 1.513 1.500 0.975 0.975 1.983 1.980
8 1.844 1.842 1.706 1.703 1.639 1.536
9 1.992 1.991 1.812 1.810 1.846 1.818
game10 game11
group MaxEnt ObEnt MaxEnt ObEnt
1 1.620 1.595 1.996 1.989
2 1.087 1.012 1.997 1.993
3 1.822 1.812 1.996 1.996
4 1.579 1.578 1.989 1.983
5 0.775 0.775 1.999 1.996
6 1.945 1.942 2.000 1.997
7 1.910 1.910 1.981 1.964
8 1.423 1.420 1.999 1.998
9 0.600 0.600 1.995 1.994
10 1.999 1.998
11 1.995 1.994
12 1.998 1.993
and empirical entropy in each group, the results explic-
itly lay in Tab. IV. Each 9 groups from game 1 to game
10 and 12 groups from game 11 have paired theoretical
maximum entropy and empirical entropy.
Interesting and natural, no empirical value exceeds the
theoretical value. The statistical ratio ObEnt/MaxEnt
is exhibited in Tab. V which is the mean of the total
pairs within a game. The ratio for game 1 to game 11
is 95.4%, 99.4%, 98.3%, 98.4%, 99.3%, 99.3%, 97.9%,
99.0%, 98.5%, 99.1%, 99.8%, respectively. All empiri-
5cal entropy values are near to the theoretical maximum
entropy values, no one is inferior to 95%.
TABLE V: Ratio of ObEnt/MaxEnt
game obs Ratio Std.Err. [95%Conf.Interval]
1 9 0.954 0.031 0.881 1.026
2 9 0.994 0.003 0.987 1.001
3 9 0.983 0.012 0.956 1.010
4 9 0.984 0.003 0.976 0.992
5 9 0.993 0.003 0.986 1.000
6 9 0.993 0.004 0.982 1.002
7 9 0.979 0.013 0.949 1.009
8 9 0.990 0.004 0.981 1.000
9 9 0.985 0.006 0.971 1.000
10 9 0.991 0.006 0.977 1.004
11 12 0.998 0.001 0.996 0.999
6 DISCUSS AND CONCLUSION
By employing experimental economics data, we test
the Principle of Maximum Entropy hypothesis. The re-
sults show, the entropy in constant sum game system fits
the Principle of Maximum Entropy very well. Thereby,
we firstly test the maximum entropy principle in social
interaction system with the simplest and competitive sit-
uation in laboratory economics experiments.
However, notice that the data used here all come from
the constant sum games with theoretical Mixed Strategy
Nash Equilibrium. Does this principle apply to other
games, i.e., social systems with other situations?
First, as we know, because of existing Mixed Strategy
Nash Equilibrium in these games, there should be some
uncertainty within it. Therefore, the degree of fitness
with principle of maximum entropy may come out to be
a signal for estimating the type of a game, i.e., the un-
certainty degree within a game. Second, in physics, the
maximum entropy principle is established on the isolation
of the system. That is to say, there are no exchange of en-
ergy or matter with environment, if there is some energy
exchange with environment, the condition of maximum
entropy principle has to be destroyed. Perhaps, there
exist some relationships between economics and physics.
As we mentioned these games are all constant sum game,
which means each payoff sum of four outcome states is
equivalent.
For instance, in their control sessions which provide
entropy result in their paper, Bednary et.al. [3] imple-
ment four type games named PD, SA, WA and SI re-
spectively. PD means prisoner’s dilemma game, SA and
WA means strange and weak alternative game, and the
SI means the selfish interesting game.
The results are reorganized and exhibited in Tab. VI.
Followed the protocol of infinitely repeated games in the
laboratory, the game they implemented is an infinitely re-
peated game, with a discount factor of 1 for the first 200
TABLE VI: Entropy in Ref. [3, 6] games
Payoff Matrix† ProbDistr‡ ObEnt§MaxEnt\
C S C S
C 7, 7 2, 10 55.68 11.67
PD£ S 10, 2 4, 4 14.82 17.82 1.68 1.79
C 7, 7 4, 14 5.02 39.81
SA£ S 14, 4 5, 5 40.37 14.81 1.68 1.99
C 7, 7 4, 11 33.18 21.57
WA£ S 11, 4 5, 5 22.74 22.51 1.98 1.98
C 7, 7 2, 9 0.00 0.14
SI£ S 9, 2 10, 10 0.00 99.86 0.02 0.02
1a 5, 3 9,−2 20.00 30.00
M1£ 1b 9,−2 5, 3 30.00 20.00 1.97 2.00
† The payoff matrix for PD, SA, WA and SI respec-
tively, where C means corporate and S means selfish
or defect. The payoff entry (i, j) presents the payoff
when Player 1 chose i and her opponent chose j .
‡ The abbreviation of probability distribution, the nu-
merical presents the probability (×100) that Player 1
chose i and her opponent chose j .
§ The abbreviation of observed entropy in experiment.
\ The abbreviation of theatrical predicted maximum en-
tropy under the given probability distribution.
£ Game PD, SA, WA and SI are from [3] and game
M1 is from [6].
rounds, and 0.9 thereafter, one 12-player session for each
of the single games. Participants are randomly matched
into pairs at the beginning of each session, and play the
same match for the entire experiment. We calculate the
theoretical maximum entropy for each game according
to the p(u) and p(l) in their games. Distinguish with
the previous results, the observed entropy here seems to
be something different from the entropy in constant sum
game. For example, the entropy in PD game and SA
game is equal to 1.68 while the prediction of maximum
entropy is 1.788 and 1.986 respectively, though the en-
tropy in WA game and SI game is near to its’ maximum
entropy prediction. Looking at the payoff matrix care-
fully, all the games here are not the constant sum game.
Another example for application of MaxEnt comes
from incomplete information games suggested by Myer-
son [6] for mechanism design. The last row in Table VI
in this paper is the payoff matrix of the example 1 in [6].
Theoretically, the mean observation should be (0.5, 0.5),
so the MaxEnt should be 2. However, due to the asymme-
try of information, the strategy of the informed principal
player (the row player) should depend on the strategy
of the uninformed column player. Because row player
has the opponent’s strategy information, so he/she can
control the result of the game, at the same time, he/she
should be constrained by an incentive-compatible mech-
anism and must give nonnegative expected payoff to the
uninformed column player (for more details of the con-
straint condition, see [6]). Supposing that the unin-
formed column player indeed chooses the two strategies
6equally, the row player should have 60% opportunity to
win; as a consequence, the distribution of the observa-
tion should not spread equally in the 4 states, and the
observed entropy should be lower than 2, see Table VI.
In this case, we show how to evaluate the symmetry of
private information in a bargain with the MaxEnt.
In economics, the Nash Equilibrium means a stable
state, in which nobody is willing to change the state.
In physics, a system will reach its’ stable state if the
entropy increases to its’ maximum value. The relation-
ship between these two stable state notions seems to be
interesting and deserving further studying. Of course,
this needs more economics experiments and cooperative
study.
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